Intrusion detection systems for smart home IoT devices: experimental comparison study by Alsakran, Faisal et al.
Intrusion Detection Systems for Smart Home
IoT Devices: Experimental Comparison Study
Faisal Alsakran1, Gueltoum Bendiab1, Stavros Shiaeles2, and Nicholas
Kolokotronis3
1 CSCAN, University of Plymouth, PL4 8AA, Plymouth, UK
faisal.alsakran@postgrad.plymouth.ac.uk, bendiab.kelthoum@umc.edu.dz
2 School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, PO1 2UP, Portsmouth, UK
sshiaeles@ieee.org
3 Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, University of Peloponnese,
22131 Tripolis, Greece
nkolok@uop.gr
Abstract. With the growing number of IoT related devices, smart homes
promise to make our lives easier and more comfortable. However, the in-
creased deployment of such smart devices brings a lot of security and
privacy risks. In order to overcome such risks, Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems are presented as pertinent tools that can provide network-level pro-
tection for smart devices deployed in home environments. These systems
monitor the network activities of the smart home-connected devices and
focus on alerting suspicious or malicious activity. They also can deal
with detected abnormal activities by hindering the impostors in access-
ing the victim devices. However, the employment of such systems in the
context of smart home can be challenging due to the devices hardware
limitations, which may restrict their ability to counter the existing and
emerging attack vectors. Therefore, this paper proposes an experimental
comparison between the widely used open-source NIDSs namely Snort,
Suricata and Bro IDS to find the most appropriate one for smart homes
in term of resources consumption including CPU and memory utilization.
Experimental Results show that Suricata and Bro are the best perform-
ing NIDS for smart homes.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT) · Smart-home · Anomaly detection
· Attack mitigation · Intrusion detection system
1 Introduction
Smart home technology enables the whole home to be automated, where the
related smart home devices can be remotely controlled and managed, from any
location in the world, through a smartphone application or other network de-
vices [13]. In recent years, smart home technology is gaining tremendous ground
at all levels. Economic reports affirm that connected home market becomes the
largest IoT segment at seven billion related smart devices in 2018, which present
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26% of the global IoT devices market [14]. According to Gartner [32] this seg-
ment is expected to grow to 20.4 billion devices by 2020. Further, the number of
householders with smart systems has grown to nearly 150 million smart house-
holders’ worldwide in 2019 [14]. The main reasons for the large adoption of such
technology are comfort, convenience, safety, and energy and cost savings [13]
However, connecting smart devices such as lights, appliances and locks intro-
duces tremendous cybersecurity risks. All security reports warn that more than
80% of connected smart home devices are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks
[11, 25]. A recent study by the cybersecurity firm Avast found that two out of
five smart homes are exposed to cyberattacks [5]. Exploiting such unsecured de-
vices by hackers can lead to all kinds of potential harm [11, 17], like switching
the security system to unlock a door [11], or cracking the smart oven until over-
heats and burns the house down [11]. In other cases, the smart home network is
infected with ransomware that requires the homeowner to pay in order to regain
access to the home network [25]. Even a simple smart light bulb can be exploited
by hackers to gain wider access to the smart home network and cause potential
physical damage [17].
In the light of all of this, it is clear that there is a major gap between se-
curity requirements and security capabilities of currently available smart home
IoT devices. One of the main reasons that make these devices insecure is the
hardware limitations [4, 30]. More specifically, restricted resources including low
power sources, small amounts of memory and limited processing power, which
means minimizing the number of processes, and consequently, the size of the
applications. These limitations hinder the execution of complexes security tasks
that generate massive computation and communication load [4]. Consequently,
security solutions for these devices should maintain a balance between the smart
home high-security requirements and supporting infrastructures’ hardware lim-
itations. Because smart home technology has a direct influence on people’s se-
curity and privacy, this issue must become the priority for security and home
automation experts [18]. In this context, there is a need for efficient Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs), which can protect smart devices used in home envi-
ronments with a minimum of resources consumption. [18, 25].
This paper aims to address this issue by examining the existing IDSs, in or-
der to find the most appropriate solution for smart homes in terms of resources
consumption. To this end, several open-source network-based intrusion detection
systems (NIDS) are available such as ACARM-ng, AIDE, Bro IDS, Snort, Suri-
cata, OSSEC HIDS, Prelud Hybrid IDS, Samhain, Fail2Ban, Security Onion,
etc. Open-source systems are considered as a cost-effective way to improve the
security of smart home environments by monitoring the home network and de-
tect internal or external cyber-attacks [26]. However, in this experimental study
we will focus on Snort, Suricata and Bro-IDS as these three NIDSs are the most
efficient and become the de-facto industry standard for intrusion detection en-
gines [2, 23, 27, 29]. The main contribution of this paper is a comparison of those
three IDSs based on CPU and RAM utilisation. The chosen IDSs are deployed
inside different Linux containers known as Dockers, instead of running them di-
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rectly on a VM base operating system. Each container has its resources that are
separated from other containers. By doing this, Snort, Suricata and Bro-IDS will
be deployed on the same virtual machine, they will have the same network and
resource setup, the resources needed will be minimal to simulate resource limi-
tation on smart homes gateways and finally comparison will. The experiments
evaluate the difference in resource usage between these NIDSs while monitoring
live network traffic under various attacks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2,we give an overview
of some prior work that is similar to our work. Section 3 gives an overview of
the chosen IDSs Snort, Suricata and Bro. Section 4 explains our evaluation
experiments and the results, and Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines the
potential future work.
2 Related work
In recent years, researchers have increased their interests in studying the perfor-
mance of different NIDSs in different environments, from different perspectives.
In this context, the performance of the Snort IDS has been extensively inves-
tigated in research studies [9, 22, 28, 29]. For instance, in [28] authors carried
out experimental evaluation and comparison of Snort NIDS in term of perfor-
mance when operating under the two popular OSs Linux and Windows. The
evaluation is done for both normal and malicious traffic, and the metrics used
were the throughput and the packet loss. Those experiments showed that Snort
is performing better on Linux than on Windows. In another work [22], authors
examined the performances of snort 2.8.0 NIDS by considering CPU and mem-
ory usage, system bus, network interface card, hard disc, logging technique, and
the pattern matching algorithm. This study showed that hardware resources
have a clear impact on the overall snort IDS performance. While authors in [9]
studied the limitations of snort IDS by conducting several experiments on a real
network environment. The performance of Snort IDS is analysed by using some
metrics including the number of packets received, analysed, filtered and dropped.
The experiments results noted that the Snort IDS failed to process high-speed
network traffic and the packet drop rate was more significant.
Several other studies conducted performance comparison between the two
popular open IDS systems Snort and Suricata [1, 3, 8, 34]. In [3], authors in-
vestigated the performance of Snort and Suricata on three different platforms:
Free BSD, Linux 2.6 and ESXi virtual server. The experiments were carried out
for different packet sizes and speeds, and measure the rates of packet drop and
alerts. Authors reported that Suricata gave better performance on Linux, while
FreeBSD is the ideal platform for Snort especially when the later run on the
high-speed network traffic. In [1], the performance comparison study of Snort
and Suricata IDSs focused on identifying the computer host resource utilisation
performance and detection accuracy. The experiments were conducted on two
different machines with different CPU, RAM and network interface configura-
tions. This study showed that Snort requires less processing power to perform
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well compared to Suricata. However, Suricata is more accurate in detecting ma-
licious traffic with high computing resources and its ruleset is more effective.
In another recent study [8], authors analysed and compered Snort and Suricata
performances on Windows and Linux platforms. Experiment results showed that
both IDSs use more resources on the Linux operating system. Authors concluded
that CPU usage is highly affected by the operating system on which the IDS
is deployed for both solutions. Study in [15] reached the same conclusions as in
[8]. Authors reported that Linux-based execution of both IDSs consumes more
system resources than its windows-based counterpart. With a similar intention,
the study in [29] examined the performance of Snort and Suricata for correctly
detecting the malicious traffic in networks. The performance of both IDSs was
evaluated on two computers with the same configuration, at 10 Gbps network
speed. The evaluation revealed that the Snort IDS processes a lower speed of
network traffic than Suricata with higher packet drop, but it uses lower com-
putational resources. In [10], authors focused on packet drops. They found that
both Snort and Suricata performed with the same behaviour with larger packets
and larger throughputs.
Few studies have considered other IDSs in the comparison such as in [31],
where authors studied the performance and the detection accuracy of Snort,
Suricata and Bro. The evaluation is done using several types of attacks includ-
ing DoS attack, DNS attack, FTP attack, Scan port attack and SNMP attack.
Further, each type of attacks is examined under various traffic rates with dif-
ferent sets of active rules. The metrics used in the evaluation include the CPU
usage and the number of packets lost and alerts. In this study, Bro IDS showed
better performance than Suricata and snort when evaluated under different at-
tack types for some specific set of rules. Also, authors concluded that the high
traffic rate has a significant effect on the CPU usage, the packets lost and the
number of alerts for the three IDSs. In a previous work [24], author compared
the three above-mentioned IDSs, looking for advantages and disadvantages of
each one. The evaluation was performed at different network speeds. The exper-
imental results showed that Suricata and Bro IDSs can handle 100 Mbps and
1 Gbps network speeds with no packet drops. In a similar context, authors in
[33] proposed a new methodology to assess the performance of the intrusion de-
tection systems snort, Ourmon and Samhain in a simulated environment. The
simulation experiments were carried out on tow kind of machines (physical and
virtual) to measure the CPU, RAM and input/output memory usage, and band-
width constraint. Authors concluded that Snort imposes more impact on network
traffic than Ourmon and Samhain IDSs. In [19] a high-level comparison is done
between Snort and Bro. In this study, the authors affirmed that Snort is the best
lightweight IDS but it not good for high-speed networks. Whereas, Bro is more
effective for Gbps networks but it is more complex to deploy and understand.
In more recent work [26] authors provided a high-level analysis and performance
evaluation of popular IDSs including Snort, Suricata, Bro IDS, Open WIPS-ng,
OSSEC, Security Onion and Fragroute. The survey concluded that most of the
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existing IDSs have low detection accuracy with minimum hardware and sensor
support.
3 Intrusion Detection Systems Snort, Suricata and Bro
Network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) collect information about in-
coming and outgoing network traffic to detect and mitigate potential attacks
(figure 1) [1, 12]. These systems utilise a combination of signature-based and
anomaly-based detection methods [12]. Signature-based detection involves com-
paring the collected data packets against signature files that are known to be
malicious, while anomaly-based detection method uses behavioural analysis to
monitor events against a baseline of ”normal” network activity. When malicious
activity arises on a network, NIDSs detect the activity and generate alerts to
notifying administrators, or blocking the source IP address from reaching the
network [12].
Fig. 1. IDS/IPS in a network architecture.
There are various open-source NIDS/NIPS that simplify the process of intru-
sion detection, and Snort is one of the most suitable solutions for small networks
[27]. It was developed in 1998 by Martin Roesch from Sourcefire 4 and is now
owned by Cisco, which acquired Sourcefire in 2013 [6]. Snort is the most widely
deployed IDS/IPS worldwide over the last decades [29]. According to The Snort
website, this IDS has been downloaded over 5 million times so far and currently
has more than 600, 000 registered users [6]. It has a single-threaded and multi-
stage packet processing architecture, which uses the TCP/IP stack to capture
and examine network packets payload [21, 29]. However, their last version Snort
3.0 has added the multiple packet processing threads in order to address the
limitation of single-threaded architecture in the previous versions. It uses both
4 Sourcefire: www.sourcefire.com
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signature-based (SIDS) and anomaly-based (AIDS) methods for anomaly detec-
tion.
The Suricata IDS is a recent NIDS compared to Snort, it was developed
in 2010 by the Open Information Security Foundation (OISF) 5 in an attempt
to meet the requirements of modern infrastructures [29]. This NIDS introduced
multi-threading to help speed up the network traffic analysis and overcome the
computational limitations of single-threaded architecture [20, 31]. Like Snort;
Suricata is rules-based and offers compatibility with Snort Rules [29], it also
provides intrusion prevention (NIPS) and network security monitoring [8], and
uses both signature-based and anomaly-based methods to detect malicious net-
work traffic [31]. Unlike Snort, Suricata provides offline analysis of PCAP files
by using a PCAP recorder. It also provides excellent deep packet inspection and
pattern matching which makes it more efficient for threat and attack detection
[1]. Many studies assume that Suricata a powerful adversary to Snort and thus
they are often compared with each other.
Bro-IDS is an open-source Unix-based NIDS and passive network traffic anal-
ysis [35]. It was originally developed in 1994 by Vern Paxson and renamed Zeek
in late 2018 [35]. Bro IDS work differently from Snort and Suricata because of
its focus on network analysis. It works as NIDS by passively monitors the net-
work traffic and looks for suspicious activity [23].Also, Bro policy scripts (rules)
are written in its own Bro scripting language thatdoes not rely on traditional
signature detection. Further, Suricata and snort are under GNU GPL licence
[29], support IPv6 traffic and their installation and deployment are easy [29].
In contrast, Bro-IDS is under BSD license, does not support IPv6 traffic and
their installation can be difficult [29, 31, 34]. In fact, Bro is more difficult and
consume more time to deploy and to understand [7]. Besides, Snort and Suri-
cata can run on any operating system including Linux, Mac OS X, FreeBSD,
OpenBSD, UNIX and Windows, whereas Bro is limited to UNIX operating sys-
tems, which limits their portability. Like snort and Suricata, Bro IDS also uses
both signature-based intrusion and anomaly-based methods to detect unusual
network behaviour [7, 31].
Table 1 shows a high-level comparison between the three IDSs and gives an
overview of the different parameters can be assembled. This high-level compar-
ison reveals that the three intrusion detection systems Suricata, Snort and Bro
have some benefits for smart homes security and no one is dominant over the
others.
4 Experimental methodology
As mentioned above, smart homes security becomes a challenging topic, in which
the security and home automation experts try to maintain a balance between the
smart home high security requirements and supporting infrastructures’ hardware
limitation. In general, these environments suffer from inherent hardware limita-
tions, which restrict their ability to implement comprehensive security measures
5 OISF: https://suricata-ids.org/about/oisf/
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Table 1. Comparison table of Snort, Suricata and Bro IDSs
Parameters Snort Suricata Bro IDS
Provider Cisco System OISF Vern Paxson
Open source licence GNU GPL licence GNU GPL licence BSD license
Operating system Win/Unix/Mac Win/Unix/Mac Unix/FreeBSD
Installation/deployment Easy Intermediate Typical
Intrusion prevention capabilities Yes Yes No
Network Traffic IPv4/IPv6 IPv4/IPv6 IPv4
Intrusion detection technique SIDS, AIDS SIDS, AIDS SIDS, AIDS
Configuration GUI Yes Yes No
Support to high speed network Medium High High
and increase their exposure to vulnerability attacks. To select the appropriate
security solutions, it is indispensable to examine these hardware limitations and
make sure that they will not affect the performance of these solutions in protect-
ing the smart home-related devices. To this end, we aim in these experiments
to examine the well-known intrusion detection systems Snort 3.0, Suricata 3.0.1
and ID Bro 2.5 to find the most suitable one for smart homes in term of resources
consumption. More concretely, we examined the real-time performances of these
IDSs while monitoring live network traffic from the smart home. Performance
information from the CPU and RAM will be recorded, analysed and compared.
4.1 Experimental setup
The experiments were performed on a virtual machine running Ubuntu 16.04
OS, with 8 GB of RAM, 40 GG of HDD and Intel Xeon CPU E5-2650 v2
running at 2.6 GHz. In the simulation scenarios, we first take a snapshot of the
clean machine before executing any malicious sample. Then, after executing the
malicious sample and recorded all information related to resources consumption
and VM state, the VM is reverted to its original form. In order to emulate the
smart home environment, we used Docker Enterprise (EE) to run the three IDSs
inside Linux containers than running them directly on the VM base operating
system. Several studies affirm that Docker is more convincing when compared
to normal VM or hypervisor in terms of processing performance including CPU,
disk and memory management, start-up and compilation speed, etc. [16]. In these
experiments, each IDS was individually installed on identical custom Docker
containers with default performance parameters (Figure 2).
The performance evaluation of each IDS is done for 20 PCAP samples of
malicious traffic generated by different types of attacks. The PCAP files were
collected from (malware-traffic-analysis.net). The same malicious pcap files were
used to monitor the resources used by the three IDSs while doing analysis of
traffic and generating alerts. For the performance evaluation of the three IDSs,
the information recorded during the execution of the malicious pcap samples
include CPU and RAM use. Tcpreplay is used to replay the malicious pcap files
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Fig. 2. Overview of the Testbed.
to the NIDSs (Figure 2). Table 2 shows the PCAP samples of malicious traffic
used in the experiments.
Table 2. PCAP samples of malicious traffic
#Id Type of the malware in the PCAP file Size of the PCAP file
#1 Malspam traffic 1.0 3MB
#2 Necurs Botnet Malspam 448 KB
#3 Payment Slip Malspam 3.0 MB
#4 MedusaHTTP malware 669 kB
#5 Adwind Malspam 1.7 kB
#6 KainXN EK 1.93 MB
#7 Cyber Ransomware 584 KB
#8 Locky-malspam-traffic 285 KB
#9 Facebook Themed Malspam 1.4 MB
#10 BOLETO Malspam infection traffic 2.4 MB
#11 Pizzacrypt 254.4 KB
#12 BIZCN Gate Actor Nuclear 0.9 8 MB
#13 Fiesta Ek 1.52 MB
#14 Nuclear EK 2 MB
#15 Fake-Netflix-login-page-traffic 768 KB
#16 URSNIF Infection with DRIDEX 2.5 MB
#17 Dridex Spam trrafic 999 KB
#18 Brazil malware spam 12.7 MB
#19 Info stealer that uses FTP to exfiltrate data 1.4 MB
#20 Hookads-Rig-EK-sends-Dreambot 595 KB
4.2 Experiments Results
CPU utilisation Figure 3 compares the results for the CPU utilisation rate
for each malware sample, for the three IDSs Snort, Suricata and Bro IDS. From
the obtained results, it is observed that the Snort IDS recorded the highest
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CPU utilisation rates for most of the PCAP samples, between 60% and 70%.
While Suricata and Bro recorded relatively lower rates for the same malware
attack tests. The CPU utilisation for Both IDSs are ranging from 20% to 40%,
however, Suricata gives the lower rates for most of the tests compared to Bro
and Snort. It is also observed that the type of malware traffic has a significant
effect on the CPU usage, each IDS gives different CPU usage rates for the same
test attack as they act quite differently for each attack.
Fig. 3. CPU utilisation results.
RAM utilisation Figure 4 compares the results for the RAM utilisation rate
for each malware sample, for the three IDSs Snort, Suricata and Bro IDS. From
the obtained results, we can also have the same conclusions for the CPU usage;
the Snort IDS gives the highest RAM utilisation rates for most of the PCAP
samples. The rates are in the range of 60% and approximately 80%. While the
highest rates were recorded for samples #4, #13 and #19. Suricata recorded
relatively lower rates than Snort ranged from 20% to approximately 40%. While
Bro IDS was the Best IDS in term of RAM usage by recording the lowest rates
for most of the tests (From 20% to approximately 34%). Like in the CPU tests,
it is also observed that the type of malware traffic has a significant effect on the
RAM usage for the three IDSs.
In summary, it can be concluded from this quantitative comparison of the
three ISDs, in term of resource usage (CPU and RAM), that Snort utilisation of
CPU and memory was higher than that of Suricata and Bro. The reasons for that
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Fig. 4. RAM utilisation results.
is the usage of Dockers and the support of multiple packet processing threads
architecture in this version of Snort (Snort3), which require more computational
resources compared to previous versions of Snort. Suricata used an average of
30.5% of memory, which exceeded Snort’s memory utilisation by approximately
10%, whereas the two IDSs achieved approximately the same results in term
of CPU usage, with an average usage of 36% for Suricata and 32% for Bro.
The obtained results from these experiments demonstrate that Suricata and Bro
perform better than Snort 3 in case of hardware limitations, therefore, they are
more suitable for smart homes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we compared the performance of the open-source IDS systems
Snort, Suricata and Bro to find the most suitable one for smart homes in term
of resources consumption including CPU and memory usage. This study using
Dockers, showed that each system had its strengths and weaknesses and the
experimental results demonstrated that Suricata and Bro utilised less resources
than Snort 3, which make them more appropriate to smart homes than Snort 3.
In the future, we expect to improve this work by conducting more experiments
on the three IDSs in term of detection accuracy as well as resources using larger
pcap files. Finally, we are intend to use real smart home environment to perform
the experiments.
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